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The global fame—or ignominy—of rebel leaders is often 
determined by the degree of violence and upheaval they 
and their armed organizations generate. Names like Jo-
seph Kony, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and Jonas Savimbi are 
inseparable from the violent political projects of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, the Islamic State, and UNITA, which 
these individuals led, respectively. But are these men rep-
resentative of rebel leaders as a class of political actors in 
international politics?  
Some rebel leaders leave colorful paper trails littered with 
details because they gave numerous public speeches, were 
prolific writers and propagandists, drew enough interest that 
observers chronicled their lives in biographies and obituaries, 
or, in some cases, spoke English and hence received more at-
tention by Western media and academics. Others, however, 
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remain in relative obscurity, whether be-
cause their armed organizations were quick-
ly defeated by the state’s armed forces or be-
cause international media and policymakers 
chose to pin their attention elsewhere.  
Collectively, then, we have voluminous de-
tails on some rebel leaders and minimal in-
formation on others, leading to patchy and 
incomplete knowledge of the individuals who 
take the helm of non-state militant groups. 
This lacuna is striking for at least two rea-
sons. First, civil wars are the dominant form 
of warfare today; most wars today occur 
within, rather than between, states, and corre-
spondingly, most people who die in war are 
dying in civil, as opposed to interstate, wars.1 
Given the importance of civil wars in interna-
tional politics, it behooves us to know more 
about who leads these violent campaigns of 
rebellion against the state. Second, the dearth 
of knowledge about rebel leaders marks a 
notable contrast with our extensive docu-
mentation and scholarship on heads of state. 
That there is better information on state 
leaders is of course unsurprising. But for 
analysis of civil wars, it does mean a signifi-
cant imbalance of information about the ad-
versaries, with disproportionate information 
available on governments as compared to 
rebels.  
THE REBEL ORGANIZATION LEADERS 
(ROLE) DATABASE 
Who, then, are these individuals who lead 
rebel organizations? Where do they come 
from, and what backgrounds, experiences, 
and skills do they bring to bear in armed 
conflict?  
Recognizing the gap in our understanding of 
the leadership of armed groups, my collabo-
rators and I compiled the Rebel Organiza-
tion Leaders (ROLE) Database.2 The first da-
taset of its kind, ROLE contains a wide range 
of biographical information on the top lead-
ers of all rebel organizations engaged in civil 
wars between 1980 and 2011, which 
amounts to 425 individuals. Whereas previ-
ously we would have been hard pressed to 
answer simple questions such as the aver-
age age or educational profiles of rebel lead-
ers in contemporary conflicts, ROLE offers 
scholars the ability to distill basic descrip-
tive information about them. Furthermore, 
ROLE enables researchers to ask new ques-
tions about how leader experiences, back-
grounds, and qualifications, such as previous 
combat experience or their upbringing 
abroad, might affect their conduct and deci-
sion-making in war.  
In Figure 1, I highlight a few intriguing find-
ings from ROLE while referring readers to 
the data introduction article for a fuller dis-
cussion of the dataset’s design, structure, 
descriptive statistics, and potential uses.3  
NEW INSIGHTS ON REBEL LEADERS 
One of the fascinating insights we glean us-
ing ROLE is that the top leaders of contem-
porary armed groups are, on the whole, 
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overwhelmingly well-educated. Of the rebel 
leaders on whom we located schooling infor-
mation, a remarkable 70 percent held de-
grees in higher education. More than one in 
five (21 percent) obtained a master’s or doc-
torate degree, a much higher figure than the 
proportion of leaders who never attended or 
finished secondary school (11 percent).4  
South Sudanese leader John Garang exempli-
fies the well-educated rebel leader: with a 
scholarship in hand, Garang left his home 
country of Sudan to earn a bachelor’s degree 
at Grinnell College in Iowa before obtaining 
a Ph.D. in economics at Iowa State Universi-
ty in the late 1970s. He was then offered a 
fellowship at UC Berkeley but chose to re-
turn to Sudan, where he launched a cam-
paign for South Sudanese independence. 
Garang, indeed, is among the 19 percent of 
rebel leaders who pursued education in the 
West.  
Other information from ROLE further ad-
vances the idea that rebel leaders constitute 
a rather distinguished and even elitist cast. 
The data shows that 38 percent of rebel 
leaders came from families with political or 
other notable elite connections. For exam-
ple, Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) which fought for 
Kurdish independence from Iraq, comes 
from a prominent Kurdish family whose 
members, including his father Mustafa Bar-
zani, have fought for the Kurdish cause for 
generations. Moreover, ROLE demonstrates 
that many rebel leaders are fairly cosmopol-
itan, as reflected in their ample international 
experiences: 38 percent studied abroad and 
15 percent worked abroad at some point 
prior to assuming rebel leadership. In all, 60 
percent acquired significant international 
experiences before becoming a rebel leader, 
whether for work, study, military training, 
or in exile.  
Thus, if there is some truth to the notion 
that rebel foot soldiers are often of the peas-
antry or come from the lower or working 
classes—as depicted in emblematic images 
of the Viet Cong—we should largely disa-
buse ourselves of the notion that rebel lead-
ers are similarly situated in society. Some 
certainly are, but the bulk of leaders more 
closely resemble well-heeled, globe-trotting, 
educated elites than toiling workers.  
These data are not merely of descriptive val-
ue; separate studies my collaborators and I 
conducted suggest that rebel leaders’ back-
grounds and experiences have notable caus-
al effects on wartime dynamics. For exam-
ple, we find that rebel leaders with prior in-
ternational experiences are significantly 
more likely to succeed in securing foreign 
support once war is underway.5 A possible 
explanation, we argue, is that experiences 
abroad provide opportunities for would-be 
leaders to meet and become acquainted with 



















































Source: Data from the ROLE database.  
Figure 1: Rebel Leaders’ Educational Profiles 
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later become valuable points of contact 
when leaders search for external sponsors. 
Garang, for example, mobilized his friends 
from his graduate school days in Iowa, who 
soon had strong connections to the US gov-
ernment, to lobby for American support for 
South Sudanese independence. 
Leader biographies, in other words, offer 
interesting insights in their own right, but 
once systematically arranged in a cross-
national dataset, they can also help explain 
important political outcomes in internation-
al politics.  
CONCLUSION 
As I write (in late August 2021), a crisis un-
folds in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s 
takeover of the state and the total collapse of 
the US-supported government. In the melee, 
many observers have pointed to President 
Joe Biden’s deep-seated skepticism of mili-
tary force, “rooted in lessons he learned 
from Vietnam,” as a way to explain why he 
ordered the rapid drawdown of US forces 
from the country.6 Others have identified the 
top Taliban leaders and scoured their pro-
files to assess how they might perform as 
governors.7 The importance of understand-
ing leaders’ backgrounds, experiences, per-
sonalities and other characteristics is both 
intuitive and long established in scholarship. 
ROLE should help observers and scholars 
gain fresh insights on how rebel leader biog-
raphies affect conflict initiation, dynamics, 
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